Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2008

DFI Properties LLC v. GR2 Enterprises LLC :
Appellants Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Karthik Nadesan; Nadesan Beck P.C.; Attorneys for Appellant;.
Carolyn Montgomery; Thomas B. Price; Callister Nebeker & McCullough; James H. Woodall;
Woodall & Wassermann; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, DFI Properties LLC v. GR2 Enterprises LLC, No. 20081067 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1399

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DFI PROPERTIES LLC,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 20081067CA

-vsGR 2 ENTERPRISES LLC,
Defendant/Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Karthik Nadesan
NADESAN BECK P.C.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Carolyn Montgomery
Thomas B. Price
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
Zions Bank Building
10 East South Temple, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
James H. Woodall
WOODALL & WASSERMAN
10653 River Front Parkway, Suite 290
South Jordan, Utah 84095

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DFI PROPERTIES LLC,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 20081067CA

-vsGR 2 ENTERPRISES LLC,
Defendant/Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Karthik Nadesan
NADESAN BECK P.C.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Carolyn Montgomery
Thomas B. Price
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
Zions Bank Building
10 East South Temple, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
James H. Woodall
WOODALL & WASSERMAN
10653 River Front Parkway, Suite 290
South Jordan, Utah 84095

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
l may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

3

ARGUMENT

5

DFFs brief confuses Findings of Fact with Conclusions of Law

5

The sanctions available under Rule 11(c) are only applicable if
a violation of Rule 11(b) has occurred

7

The expedited trial schedule does excuse the District Court's
failure to enter an order to show cause, provide GR 2 with
adequate notice of the Rule 11 hearing, or provide GR2
with a reasonable opportunity to respond

8

The District Court failed to enter sufficient findings of fact
and conclusions of law to support its order

11

DFI has not addressed whether the filing of the
Nato Nation documents, irrespective of who filed it,
constituted a violation of Rule 11

12

Entry of a default judgment was not an appropriate sanction
under Rule 11 or the facts of this case

12

CONCLUSION

. . .

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
2 may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASE LAW
Agency of Natural Resources v. Lyndonville Savings Bank & Trust Co.,
811 A.2d 1232 (Vt. 2001)

7

Bailley-Allen Co.Jnc. v. Kurzet 945 P.2d 180, 194 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)

12

Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992)

6

Chen v. Stewart. 2005 UT 68, f 43, 123 P.3d 416 (Utah 2005)

14

Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78, If 10, 985 P.2d 255 (Utah 1999)

6,7,11

Hales v. Oldrovd, 2000 UT 75, 999 P.2d 588, 595 (Utah Ct. App. 2000)

13

Jiminez v. Madison Area Technical College, 321 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2003)

13

Kaisermann Assoc. Inc. v. Town, 977 P.2d 462, 463 (Utah 1999)

8

L.B. Foster Co. v. America Piles, Inc.. 138 F.3d 81 (2nd Cir. 1998)

9

Poulsen v. Freer, 946 P.2d 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)

. . . 9

Rice v. City of Chicago. 333 F.3d 780. 786 (7th Cir. 2003)

13

Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)

6

Thornton v. General Motors Corp.. 136 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 1998)

9

Tracy-Burke Associates v. Dept. of Employment Security.
699 P.2d 687 (Utah 1985).

8,11

UDOT v. Osguthorpe. 892 P.2d 4. 7 (Utah 1995)

14

Willev v. Willev. 951 P.2d 226. 230 (Utah 1997)

11

OTHER
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendments

9,13

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
3 may contain errors.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
4 may contain errors.

5,7,9,12

ARGUMENT
I.

DFFs brief confuses Findings of Fact with Conclusions of Law.
In its brief, DFI correctly states that the District Court's findings of fact cannot be

reversed unless they are clearly erroneous. DFI implies that the one of the findings of fact
subject to the clearly erroneous standard is the District Court's conclusion that "there's
no reasonable basis to believe that these documents are anything other than frivolous, that
they have been submitted to the court for ... the only reason [of delaying] these
proceedings." (R 294:8). Given DFI's failure to submit a proposed order, it is uncertain
whether the District Court made any findings of fact or conclusions of law other than the
above statement. However, it is certain that the District Court's statement can only be
classified as a conclusion of law, and must therefore be reviewed under the correction of
error standard.
A violation of Rule 11 occurs when an attorney or unrepresented party presents a
document before the court that is for "any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay" or is not "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b) (2009). Accordingly, a district court may make findings of
fact regarding the nature and circumstances of the document that was filed. However, the
holdings that a document is frivolous or has been filed for the improper purpose of
unnecessary delay are ultimate conclusions of law. Many pleadings that do not violate
Rule 11 are unsupported by existing law or result in delay. In order to find a violation of
Rule 11, the district court must go beyond the factual circumstance of the document and
determine that the delay was unnecessary as a matter of law or that no "nonfrivolous
argument" for filing the document can be found.
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This distinction between conclusions of law and findings of fact is borne out by
Utah case law. Thus, in Taylor v. Hansen, the district court the appellant's motion was
"improper and groundless" and "wholly without any merit whatsoever in law or fact."
Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 930 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). However, the Utah Court of
Appeals found that the "the trial court's conclusion that Taylor violated Rule 11 is error."
Id. (empasis added). Furthermore, the Court analyzed the conclusions at issue under the
correction of error standard to determine that the motion was neither meritless nor
objectively unreasonable under the circumstances." Id. Similarly, in Barnard v. Sutliff,
the trial court determined that Barnard's knowledge of decisions by two other district
courts was irrelevant and that the law regarding the issue in question was clear. Barnard
v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, (Utah 1992). The Utah Supreme Court noted that "[b]ecause
both of these grounds are, in effect, legal conclusions, we review them for correctness."
Id And, on all fours with this case, in Griffith v. Griffith J 999 UT 78, ^ 10, 985 P.2d
255 (Utah 1999), the district court's order contained a "factual finding" that:
Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Defendant's Attorney filed on January 4,
1996, was not well grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law,
and was filed for an improper purpose to harass Defendant and cause
unnecessary delay and needless increase in the costs of litigation.
The Utah Supreme Court concluded that "this purported factual finding, drafted as it was
by counsel for the prevailing party, simply paraphrasing the language of rale 11, and
standing by itself without any detailed factual findings particularizing its conclusions is
insufficiently specific as a matter of law to support the imposition of rale 11 sanctions."
Id. (emphasis added). The Court further explained that the "law requires that a trial court
make a series of specific factual findings as a predicate for concluding that the rale has
been violated, and then must determine the appropriate sanction ... [t]he trial court's
findings and conclusions must reveal the court's reasoning clearly enough that an
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appellate court can apply the appropriate standard of review to each part of the trial
court's ruling." Id.
In this case, although there do not appear to be any specific findings of fact in the
record, the documents filed by Mr. Granados and their contents are undisputed. Instead,
the District Court's conclusion of law, that the filing of the documents was frivolous and
for the improper purpose of delay is being appealed. Contrary to DFFs assertions, that
conclusion must be reviewed under a correction of error standard.
II.

The sanctions available under Rule 11(c) are only applicable if a violation of
Rule 11(b) has occurred.
Contrary to DFFs argument, the fact that a represented party may be sanctioned

under Rule 11(c) does not imply that a represented party can violate Rule 11(b). The
language of Rule 11(b) is clear: u[b]y presenting a pleading, written motion, or other
paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information,
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances," that the
representations within the document meets the criteria specified in subsections (b)(1)
through (b)(4). Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b) (2009) (emphasis added). In this case, GR 2 was a
represented party and therefore, its conduct does not fall within the ambit of Rule 11(b).
DFI argues that Rule 11(c) allows the court to "impose an appropriate sanction on
any attorney, law firm, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for
the violation" and therefore a represented party may be sanctioned even if it has not
violated Rule 11(b). However, before it is applicable, Rule 11(c) first requires a violation
of Rule 11(b) to have occurred. And DFI has provided no argument or explanation of
how a violation of Rule 11(b) occurred when GR 2 was represented at the time the Nato
Nation documents were filed and GR 2's attorney did not make the filing. See Agency of
Natural Resources v. Lyndonville Savings Bank & Trust Co., 811 A.2d 1232 (Vt. 2001)
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("Rule 11 is the appropriate vehicle only if one seeks sanctions against an unrepresented
party or a lawyer for a party ... Neither Rule 11 nor its safe harbor provision applies if
the moving party is seeking sanctions against a represented litigant.")
Utah courts have strictly construed the language of Rule 11(b) in determining
whether a violation of the Rule has occurred. Thus, in Kaisermann Assoc. Inc. v. Town,
977 P.2d 462, 463 (Utah 1999), the appellant attorney had obtained a writ of garnishment
in violation of Utah law. However, at the time of the alleged violation, Rule 11 required
that the attorney or party sign the document in question. Id at 464. Therefore, because
the writ of garnishment had been signed by the court clerk, and not by the attorney, the
Utah Supreme Court found that no violation of Rule 11 had occurred. Id. at 465. In this
case, Rule 11(b) requires that an attorney or unrepresented party present a document to
the court before a violation can occur. Because those circumstances do not exist with
respect to Mr.Granados' filing of the Nato Nation documents, Rule 11 is simply not
applicable to this case.
Furthermore, DFFs argument that GR 2 can be sanctioned under Rule 11(b)
because Mr. Granados was acting as its agent must also fail. Rule 11(b) requires the
document in question to be presented by an attorney or an unrepresented party. It does
not make an exception for filings by agents of represented parties. Nor does Utah law
support DFI's assertion that agents of corporate litigants can properly file pleadings on
behalf of their clients. See Tracy-Burke Associates v. Dept. of Employment Security,
699 P.2d 687, 688 (Utah 1985) ("It has long been the law of this jurisdiction that a
corporate litigant must be represented in court by a licensed attorney.")

III.

The expedited trial schedule does excuse the District Court's failure to enter
an order to show cause, provide GR 2 with adequate notice of the Rule 11
hearing, or provide GR2 with a reasonable opportunity to respond.
DFI argues that GR 2 had adequate notice and opportunity to respond in light of
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the expedited nature of the proceeding. However, in order to initiate Rule 11 sanction
sua sponte, "the court may enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to
violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it
has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto." Utah R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(B)
(2009). Furthermore, a court may only impose sanctions "[i]f, after notice and a
reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been
violated." Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) (2009) (emphasis added). DFI has failed
to provide a reasonable explanation for why the existence of a trial date ten days later
excused the District Court from compliance with the due process requirements of Rule
11.
First, the existence of a trial date ten days later should not have effected whether
an order to show cause was entered by the court. The requirement that the court enter an
order to show cause was added to Rule 11 because a party is not shielded by the 21-day
"safe harbor" period when a court initiates Rule 11 sanctions sua sponte. See Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendments; Thornton
v. General Motors Corp., 136 F.3d 450, 451 (5th Cir. 1998); L.B. Foster Co. v. America
Piles, Inc., 138 F.3d 81, 89 (2nd Cir. 1998) ('[i]f the sanctions are to be imposed sua
sponte [under Rule 11], the court must proceed by order to show cause"). Thus, in
Poulsen v. Freer, 946 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the Utah Court of Appeals
noted that u[w]hen a court imposes sanctions sua sponte, due process requirements are
met if the court issues an order to show cause ... and allows the party a reasonable time
in which to file a response." While the trial in the matter may have been scheduled
within ten days of the date the Nato Nation documents were filed, DFI has failed to
provide any argument why the District Court did not have the time to enter an order to
show cause prior to the hearing. Certainly the District Court had sufficient time to
schedule a review hearing on December 8, 2008, in which it stated that it would hold a
Rule 11 sanction hearing the very next day. Moreover, the District Court did not inform
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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GR 2's counsel that he should be prepared to respond on GR 2's behalf at the Rule 11
hearing. Instead, the district court told Mr. Jeffs that he would be allowed to withdraw
as counsel at the end of the hearing, instructed Mr. Jeffs to inform GR 2 of the hearing
through an off-record letter, and stated "that if [GR 2] wants to be heard [it will] need to
bring a lawyer." (R 293:5-7). As a result, GR 2 only received notice of the Rule 11
hearing in the late evening and was unable to retain new counsel on the morning before
the hearing. Given the timing and nature of the notice GR 2 received, it was clearly not
afforded sufficient notice to adequately respond at the Rule 11 hearing.
Similarly, DFI has failed to adequately explain why the Rule 11 hearing needed to
be held the day after the Nato Nation documents were filed. The District Court had ten
days before the trial in the matter was scheduled. It could have scheduled the Rule 11
hearing at any time within those ten days and thus provided GR 2 with greater notice and
more time to prepare a response. DFI argues that holding the hearing closer to the trial
date would have resulted in it expending time and resources in trial preparation.
However, procedural fairness must always take precedence over the convenience of one
of the parties. At the time the Rule 11 hearing was scheduled, it was possible for the
District Court to have found that GR 2 was not in violation of Rule 11 or to have imposed
lesser sanctions. Furthermore, the District Court could have balanced procedural fairness
with DFI's expenses by scheduling the hearing at a later date and ordering GR 2 to pay
DFI's attorneys' fees for trial preparation. Instead, the District Court gave GR 2 less than
a day's notice of the hearing and, in effect, told GR 2's lawyer that he would not have to
respond on its behalf at the hearing.
In addition, GR 2 was clearly denied an opportunity to respond at the hearing.
Although Mr. Jeffs initially appeared for GR 2, the district court did not ask him to
respond to the Rule 11 allegations on behalf of GR 2. Instead, it instructed Mr. Jeffs to
take a seat and instructed Mr. Granados to come up to the counsel table. (R. 294:1-2).
Then, after verifying that Mr. Granados had filed the Nato Nation documents, the district
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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court summarily concluded that it had reviewed the Nato Nation documents "and found
that their legal contentions are not warranted by existing law and are in fact frivolous, and
that the allegations in them a, don't have evidentiary support." (R 294:3-4). The District
Court only allowed Mr. Granados to speak after it had already announced its ruling.
(R.294:4). And, as established by long standing Utah law, Mr. Granados is not permitted
to represent GR 2 in court proceedings. See Tracy-Burke Associates, 699 P.2d 687, 688
(Utah 1985). As a result, GR 2 was denied any opportunity to respond prior to the
District Court reaching its decision.
IV.

The District Court failed to enter sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of
law to support its order.
DFI claims that the record contains ample findings of fact and conclusions of law

in support of the District Court's order. However, just as DFI failed to submit to the
District Court a proposed Order with findings of fact and conclusions of law, DFI has
failed to marshal the findings of fact and conclusions of law that it claims are in the
record. "[A] trial court is required to make explicit findings of fact in support of its legal
conclusions." See Willey v. Willev, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997). Moreover, the Utah
Supreme Court has found this "particularly necessary in the rule 11 area." Griffith, 1999
UT 78 at Tf 10.

"The law requires that a trial court make a series of specific factual

findings as a predicate for concluding that the rule has been violated, and then must
determine the appropriate sanction ... The trial court's findings and conclusions must
reveal the court's reasoning clearly enough that an appellate court can apply the
appropriate standard of review to each part of the trial court's ruling." Id. In this case,
the written record and the transcripts of the hearing are unclear as to which statements by
the district court constituted formal findings of fact and conclusions of law. As a result,
the District Court has not made sufficient findings of facts and conclusions of law to
support its order.
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V.

DFI has not addressed whether the filing of the Nato Nation documents,
irrespective of who filed it, constituted a violation of Rule 11.
In Section IV of its Appeal Brief, GR 2 argued that even if Rule 11 applied to the

conduct of Mr. Granados, the filing of the Nato Nation documents did not result in a
violation of Rule 11. Specifically, GR 2 argued that no violation could have occurred
because there is no Utah case law prohibiting the filing of documents from the tribal
courts of Native American tribes not recognized by the U.S department of Interior, and
no clear case law on the issue from other jurisdictions. DFFs brief does not address this
issue.
VI.

Entry of a default judgment was not an appropriate sanction under Rule 11
or the facts of this case.
DFI acknowledges that there is no Utah case law authorizing the imposition of a

default judgment as a sanction for violating Rule 11. DFI further acknowledges that the
normal sanction for a Rule 11 sanction is recovery of attorneys' fees. See Bailley-Allen
Co. Jnc. v. Kurzet 945 P.2d 180, 194 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Indeed the plain language of
Rule 11 states that "[a] sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what
is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly
situated ... the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an
order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable
attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation." Utah R. of
Civ. Pr. 11(c)(2) (2009) (emphasis added). Thus the language of the Rule 11 appears to
clearly distinguish between directives of a nonmonetary nature as opposed to orders to
pay a penalty.
Instead, DFI argues that the sanction of a default judgment is authorized because it
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has been adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See Jiminez v.
Madison Area Technical College, 321 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2003). However, even if this
Court was to find these cases persuasive, it is clear that only a minority of jurisdictions
have interpreted Rule 11 as permitting the ultimate sanction of dismissal. Indeed, while
DFI cites to the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as supporting dismissal as a sanction, even the Advisory Committee Notes are
limit sanctions to "dismissal of a claim, preclusion of a defense, or preparation of an
amended pleading." Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendments to Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. DFI has provided no other argument for why Utah
should adopt an interpretation of Rule 11 that places it within the minority of
jurisdictions.
Furthermore, even those jurisdictions that have adopted the sanction of dismissal
only apply it in the most extreme of circumstances. Thus, in Jiminez, the sanctioned
party had provided falsified documents in order to bolster her claim. 321 F.3d 656. Thus
the court of appeals noted that the sanction of dismissal was appropriate given that the
sanctioned party's "claim was so unmeritorious and her behavior so deceptive that the
filing of her baseless claim amounted to a veritable attack on our system of justice." L±
at 657. Indeed, in the Seventh Circuit, "it is well settled ... that the ultimate sanction of
dismissal should be involved only in extreme situations, when there is a clear record of
delay or contumacious conduct, or when other less drastic sanctions have proven
unavailable." Rice v. City of Chicago, 333 F.3d 780, 786 (7th Cir. 2003) (quotations
omitted) (reversing sanction of dismissal where plaintiff had been tardy in complying
with court orders). Similarly, in the context of Rule 37 sanctions in Utah, the sanction of
dismissal has only been imposed for egregious violations. See Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 UT
75, 999 P.2d 588, 595 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (affirming dismissal based on ample
evidence of multiple delays and failures to respond to discovery requests and court
orders); UDOT v. Osguthorpe. 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah 1995) (finding more than adequate
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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evidence that Osguthorpe willfully failed to respond to the court order compelling
discovery).
However, in this case, DFI has failed to explain why GR 2's filing of the Nato
Nation documents was so egregious and contumacious that it amounted to "a vertaible
attack on out system of justice." In fact, DFI has not even responded to GR 2's argument
that the filing of documents from an unrecognized tribe is not a violation of Rule 11.
Similarly, DFI has failed to explain why a lesser sanction, such as the imposition of a
monetary penalty, would not have deterred similar conduct in the future.
Moreover, DFI's argument that the District Court had the inherent contempt
authority to enter the sanction of dismissal is inapplicable to the facts of this case. At the
hearing, the District Court clearly indicated that it was sanctioning GR 2 pursuant to Rule
11. Specifically, the District Court stated that "[b]ased upon that finding that under Rule
11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure I'm going to strike your answer and counterclaim
and enter a default against you." (R 294:8). As a result, DFI cannot rely on the District
Court's inherent authority to sanction contempt to justify a dismissal entered pursuant to
Rule 11. Indeed, even under a court's contempt authority, it may only do so "if the party
engages in conduct designed to improperly influence the court's decision on the merits of
the case, such as perjury or obstruction or justice, or if the conduct itself tends to
demonstrate bad faith or a lack of merit." Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68,143, 123 P.3d
416 (Utah 2005).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that the District Court's
December 9, 2008, Order and Judgment be reversed and the case be remanded to the
District Court.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of September, 2009.
NadesanBeck P.C.

O^
anhik Nadesan
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